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Key points
1. The most significant achievement of Vladimir
PutinÕs team over the three years of his term of
office is the realisation of legislative changes,
which may constitute a base for further Ð more
detailed Ð political and economic reforms. This
is, to a certain degree, a return to the economic
tasks set out by a team of reformists in the early
1990s, which were impossible to realise at the ti-
me due to conflicts between the Kremlin and le-
gislative powers.
2. The political reforms introduced during Pu-
tinÕs term of office aimed primarily at increasing
the KremlinÕs control over RussiaÕs socio-political
life. This goal has been achieved to a large
extent. In effect, it has given rise to a growth in
the authority and position of the Kremlin, on the
one hand and, on the other, to the authoritarisa-
tion of RussiaÕs political system.
3. Within the economic sphere, over the past
three and a half years, a land reform was carried
out (enabling land sales transactions in the Rus-
sian Federation), and changes were also introdu-
ced within the budgetary-fiscal sphere and the
pension system. Russia was crossed off the Fi-
nancial Action Task ForceÕs (FATF) blacklist and
granted the status of a market economy by the
EU and the USA. Simultaneously, however, pres-
s u re from various groups from the pre s i-
dentÕs entourage opposing the reforms, and also
business and regional elites, meant that reform
projects often lost their liberal undertone and
radicalism already at the stage of forming a legal
base. For this among other reasons, the changes
initiated in almost all spheres of the Russian eco-
nomy in many cases proved to be inconsistent
and incomplete. Problems with their implemen-
tation and the slow pace of structural reforms
did not allow for the strengthening of spheres
other than the raw material sector or making
the Russian economy less dependent on the situ-
ation on foreign raw material markets. Therefo-
re, the main goals of President PutinÕs economic
reform programme have not been realised.
4. Non-legislative changes undertaken by the
presidential circle were also of particular signifi-
cance for RussiaÕs present situation. These chan-
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ges had no legal basis and resulted from infor-
mal actions undertaken or inspired by the autho-
rities. As a result of these activities, the presi-
dent gained a loyal majority in parliament, in-
creased the role of security services in the coun-
try, simultaneously putting a stop to the direct
influence of big business on the KremlinÕs politi-
cal decisions. Non-legislative changes have also
led to the restriction of freedom of speech and
pluralism of information in Russia.
5. It seems that the reform process initiated by
President Putin still depends primarily on the
support of the Kremlin. Because of this, the con-
tinuation of reforms over the coming years will
be closely linked with PutinÕs position following
his likely re-election in March 2004, and his poli-
tical determination to continue with the chan-
ges. Aside from internal factors, petroleum pri-
ces on the global market will also be of key signi-
ficance for the reform process. Such dependence
is limiting RussiaÕs chance for real modernisa-
tion over the next few years.
I n t r o d u c t i o n
Following his rise to power in 2000, Vladimir Pu-
tin presented a comprehensive socio-economic
programme for the development of Russia thro-
ugh to 20101. This programme was prepared by
a team of economic experts from the Centre for
Strategic Studies (CS S )2 led by St. Pe t e r s-
burgÕs German Gref. In spite of the fact that this
document was never accepted in its entirety, and
only its main assumptions were approved, as of
2000, short- and medium-term socio-economic
government programmes have been based on
the same principles.
The medium-term goal of this development stra-
tegy through to 2010 was the reduction of the
widening gap between Russia and developed na-
tions. The long-term goal, on the other hand,
was the restoration and strengthening of Rus-
siaÕs position as a leader on the global scale3.
The reforms of RussiaÕs political system, social
policy and the modernisation of the economy
were intended to help achieve these goals. 
The aim of this study is to describe and analyse
political and socio-economic reforms, as well as
non-legislative changes initiated under Vladimir
Pu t i nÕ sp re s i d e n c y. New reform activities will pro-
bably not be initiated over the six months re m a-
ining until the presidential elections. For this re-
ason, it is already possible to summarise the
changes achieved in the political, economic and
social spheres during President Pu t i nÕ s first term
of office.
A description of the political and economic re-
forms and also of non-legislative changes, which
took place in the Russian Federation over the
past three and a half years, has been included in
Part I of this study. The conclusion hereof at-
tempts to summarise the actual achievements of
President Pu t i nÕ s team, and to answer the qu-
estion concerning perspectives of the reform pro-
cess and factors determining the shape there o f .
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Reforms and changes
Reforms realised during Vladimir PutinÕs presi-
dency have taken place on two levels.
On the one hand, reforms were carried out on
the basis of legislative changes prepared by the
government (the CSSÕs strategy) or the Presi-
dentÕs Administration, and voted on by the par-
liament. These primarily concerned the econo-
my, but also political matters. Actions underta-
ken in these areas aimed, above all, at strengthe-
ning and centralising the state, as well as imple-
menting changes of a market character in the
Russian economy.
On the other hand, other transformations also
took place in Russia that did not result from le-
gislative changes, but from informal activities
either undertaken or inspired by the authorities.
Most of these aimed at increasing the control of
authorities over public life (political and econo-
mic institutions, media, etc.).
1. The most significant political 
reforms 
1.1. The administrative-territorial reform
The main assumption of the administrative re-
form was to strengthen the federal centreÕs con-
trol over the FederationÕs entities.
The first stage of the reform was initiated just
after Vladimir Putin took over the presidency of
the Russian Federation (RF). In May 2000, the
President issued a decree concerning the divi-
sion of the Russian Federation into seven federal
districts (okrugs)4, in which the formation of re-
gional departments of federal structures (public
prosecutorsÕ offices and the Interior Ministry,
among others) was gradually initiated. In accor-
dance with a subsequent decree, also issued in
May, each district was headed by an authorised
representative of President Putin, who was to
ensure that the PresidentÕs constitutional rights
were exercised in the region5. The role of the Pre-
sidentÕs representatives was, de facto, to directly
inform the Kremlin of any significant processes
taking place in the region on the one hand, and
to influence regional politics so as to protect the
interests of the centre on the other.
Subsequent clauses from the administrative re-
form package introduced the possibility of the
president dismissing regional heads6 on the ba-
sis of a court verdict, and dissolving local parlia-
ments. Governors, on the other hand, were gran-
ted the right to dismiss the mayors of larger
towns in their own regions. It is worth noting,
h o w e v e r, that over more than three years since
these reforms were accepted, the Kremlin has not
yet resorted to using the mechanisms establi-
shed at the time for dismissing regional heads.
Informal mechanisms (blackmail, the nomination
for another position, etc.) were used instead in
the few cases when governors were re m o v e d .
In summer of 2000 parliament adopted a law
changing the procedure of electing the upper
chamber of the Russian parliament Ð the Federa-
tion Council. Instead of ex officio governors and
heads of local parliaments, the chamber is pre-
sently composed of regional representatives of
legislative and executive powers nominated by
regional authorities (the governor and the par-
liament). Governors, upon leaving the Federa-
tion Council, lost immunity and direct access to
the process of law making and lobbying on the
highest level their own interests or the interests
of their regions. The heads of the Federation en-
tities have been assembled in a newly appointed
institution of an advisory nature Ð the State Co-
uncil, whose rank is decidedly lower than that of
the Federation Council. The Federation Council,
with the removal of governors, has also lost its
former significance.
Another level of administrative reform was the
activation of the process of adapting regional le-
gislature to federal legislature (a large part of
the legislative attainments of the re g i o n s ,
which, under YeltsinÕs presidency, gained an ad-
vanced level of independence, was inconsistent
with federal legislature). In this process, a series
of legislative acts of RF authorities were nullified
on the strength of the Constitutional Tribu-
nalÕs verdict and the decision of courts. Regional
supervision of the process of Òstandardising le-
gal spaceÓ was taken over by the presidentÕs au-
thorised representatives in the regions. Howe-
ver, it has not yet been possible to complete this
process: a number of entities, in particular the
most independent (Tatarstan, Bashkiria), conti-
nue to torpedo the process of adapting their le-
gislations, e.g. by leaving references in their re-
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gional constitutions to the sovereignty of the re-
publics7.
The latest phase of the administrative reform
carried out thus far is the already initiated local
government reform (it has passed the first re-
ading in the Duma). Its purpose is to specify the
scope of competences and the source of finan-
cing for local governments (partly at the expen-
se of regional authorities)8. These changes were
negatively evaluated by regional authorities. At
present, during the pre-election period, federal
authorities have decided to hold back the pace
of the reform, as they need the support of the
governors during the elections.
Legal changes within the scope of the admini-
strative and budgetary reform have had the lar-
gest influence on the change in relations betwe-
en the centre and the regions. However, Moscow
is supplementing this legislative advantage by
affecting regional authorities through the use of
informal methods. Mention should be made of
the following informal instruments lying at the
KremlinÕs disposal: control over the General Pro-
secutorÕs Office (the ability to ÒblackmailÓ regio-
nal leaders by law enforcement agencies), secu-
rity services (access to compromising informa-
tion), the Accounts Chamber (the ability to mani-
pulate the regionÕs financial control results), the
Central Election Committee (the ability to influ-
ence the election process in the regions), and al-
so the ability to pressure business representati-
ves active in the province. Such mechanisms ha-
ve been used in the case of authorities from re-
gions of key significance to the state, rich in na-
tural resources (e.g. Primorsk Krai, Irkutsk or
Krasnoyarsk Krai9), as well as in the case of fede-
ral elections. 
When summarising the outcome of the changes
in relations of the centre and the regions, one
should note the double nature of these proces-
ses. On the one hand, with the help of legal
changes and informal activities, Moscow was
partly able to achieve the most important aim of
the administrative reform: to stop disintegrative
tendencies in the Russian Federation and restrict
the regional elitesÕ influence on a federal level.
On the other hand, however, the positions of go-
vernors remained very strong within the territo-
ry of their regions. This situation did not change
with the introduction of a presidentÕs authorised
representative in the federal disctricts. With no
serious financial instruments, the presidentÕs re-
presentatives are currently almost solely carry-
ing out supervisory functions. The Kremlin has
been unable to break up regional politico-busi-
ness clans; it is also rarely able to influence the
election results in the respective entities of the
RF. As a result, the KremlinÕs dependence on the
informal support of governors (e.g. during elec-
tions) is still considerable. The series of actions
undertaken by Moscow proves its awareness of
regional leadersÕ potential so, in specific situ-
ations, the Kremlin chooses compromise solu-
tions10. Such solutions inspired by the Kremlin
include allowing governors to remain in power
for more than two terms of office11, postponing
reforms of the local government or the power
engineering sector, which regional leaders are
against. 
1.2. The reform of the party system 
and electoral legislation
The reform of the party system began in 2001. In
July, parliament accepted the act Òon political
partiesÓ. This act enabled only political parties
or coalitions formed by them to participate in
elections. Simultaneously, criteria according to
which parties operate in the RF were toughe-
ned12, which led to a considerable reduction in
the number of political parties (there are presen-
tly around 50, five to six of which are of real im-
portance). The authors of these changes also (or
maybe primarily) intended to increase the au-
thoritiesÕ influence on the party scene Ð the pro-
cedure for registering parties and verifying their
work in practice has already been used to place
pressure on opposition political organisations13.
The process of reforming electoral legislation
was initiated in 2002 by the passing of several
legislative acts in the Duma. These included,
among others: the Voting Rights Act (June 2002),
the act on the electoral systems of parliamenta-
ry elections (November 2002) and presidential
elections (December 2002) and the act on the
computer system calculating the votes (January
2003).
The intention of the authors of the party and
election reform complies with the leading tho-
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ught behind other moves to restrict political plu-
ralism: the elimination of smaller groups from
the election game (by raising the electoral thre-
shold to 7 percent)14 and increasing MoscowÕs in-
fluence on regional elections. Clauses of the re-
form of the electoral legislation allow for the in-
crease of the influence that the Central Election
Committee has on regional committees (toge-
ther with the right to veto the verdict of the re-
gional committee). These clauses also introduce
a ban on the existence of regional parties and
the command to adapt regional majority electo-
ral systems to the mixed federal system (which
in practice translates to the handing over of 50
percent of seats in regional parliaments to fede-
ral parties). A concession made to the regions
was the lowering of the level of required voting
turnout to 20 percent in regional elections15.
Clauses of the act on regional elections became
binding in July 2003, so it is too early to verify
their effectiveness. On the other hand, the party
reform can already be considered a success of
the Kremlin: it was able to increase its control
over processes on the party scene whilst simul-
taneously maintaining the guise of pluralism.
Non-party initiatives of citizens were in practice
deprived of the ability to participate in Rus-
siaÕs political life. Generally, changes concerning
the operation of political parties and election
procedures are cementing the current arrange-
ment on the political scene, dominated by the
executive power with the marginal role of the
political parties, often constituting an instru-
ment of the Kremlin.
1.3. Reforms of the judiciary system and
the institution of the public prosecutor
The package of draft bills reforming many sphe-
res of justice was prepared by the PresidentÕs Ad-
ministration and passed through parliament
with practically no amendments. 
Within the reform of the judiciary system and
public prosecutorsÕ office, the Russian parlia-
ment has adopted, among others, codes of arbi-
tration procedure, civil procedure and penal pro-
cedure, as well as a number of acts concerning
individual groups of professionals (lawyers, jud-
ges, etc.). The most significant changes to be in-
troduced include the strengthening of courts at
the expense of public prosecutorsÕ offices (trans-
ferring the decision concerning arrests and sear-
ches from the competence of public prosecutors
to courts), granting public prosecutors the exclu-
sive right to initiate proceedings (other ÒpowerÓ
ministries were earlier authorised to this task as
well), levelling the rights of the public prosecu-
tor and the barrister appointing juries in courts
(this process is currently being realised) and
transferring economic disputes to courts of arbi-
tration16. Furthermore, in April 2003, the Duma
adopted in the first reading, amendments intro-
duced by President Putin to the penal code, pro-
viding for the mitigation of charges for petty cri-
mes (or the exchange thereof for fines). 
Changes have also been introduced within the
judiciary reform that may be seen as restricting
the independence of the judicial branch of the
government: the immunity of judges has been li-
mited through the stipulation of the procedure
of judgesÕ penal and administrative responsibili-
ty (until now they enjoyed complete immunity).
A principle of cadency has been introduced for
the presiding judges in courts and the Krem-
linÕs level of participation in nominating such
persons has been increased. Furthermore, the
term of office of judges has been limited through
the establishment of a retirement age.
In conclusion it can be ascertained that the au-
thors of the judiciary reform had been aiming to
bring certain spheres of RussiaÕs justice admini-
stration closer to the norms binding in democra-
tic states. The effect of these changes was a fall
in the number of cases (by 20 percent) and the
number of people on remand (by half)17. The pro-
cess of jury formation is also quite advanced Ð in
most regions (around 70 including Moscow) the-
se are already functioning. The chance for reali-
sing some clauses of the reform is additionally
improved by the fact that funds for the judiciary
reform were increased by 33 percent in the 2003
budget.
Simultaneously, however, the judiciary reform Ð
similarly to other political reforms Ð assumed
the maintenance of the KremlinÕs informal con-
trol over judicature and public prosecutors. In
Russia we are constantly dealing with the consi-
derable ÒpoliticisingÓ of courts and public prose-
cutorsÕ offices. Some clauses of the reform (e.g.
lowering the status of judges and restriction of
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their immunity) strengthen the domination of
executive powers over judicature. Therefore, one
should presume that the phenomenon of explo-
iting organs of justice in the political battle will
continue in the future18, and the independence
of the governmentÕs judicial branch shall remain
only a formal clause in the Russian Constitution.
1.4. Reform of the public service system
The reform of the state administration appara-
tus is currently at the legislative phase. The Du-
ma has adopted in three readings the presiden-
tial act Òon the RFÕs public service systemÓ,
which is a general outline of the reform and is to
be supplemented by a package of detailed acts.
This reform intends to introduce a division of
the state service into a federal civil service, fede-
ral military service and federal law enforcement
service, as well as a regional civil service of RF
entities. It assumes the introduction of a compe-
titive principle when staffing positions, the
conclusion of agreements for the performance of
functions, the creation of a mechanism to verify
the competences of officials, as well as conditio-
ning income on professional achievements. De-
spite these liberal ideas, the reform also provi-
des for the conditioning of promotions on the
number of years worked and creates opportuni-
ties for officials Òwith experienceÓ leaving one
sector (e.g. military officials) to immediately oc-
cupy high positions in another.
The need to reform the administration appara-
tus is enormous due to the overgrowth, lack of
effectiveness and conservatism of Russian bure-
aucracy, as well as its degree of control over the
Russian economy (the private sector as well) and
politics. When evaluating the clauses of the fra-
mework act, it should be noted that the intro-
duction of fixed mechanisms for the verification
of the competences of officials would undoubte-
dly improve the quality of work carried out by
the bure a u c r a c y. (Presently some of the delays in
realising certain reforms result from faulty secon-
d a ry legislation created by bureaucracy at a m e-
dium and low level). On the other hand, the idea
of increasing wages for better professional re-
sults could help decrease the level of corru p t i o n .
It is still too early to evaluate the results of this
reform; no concrete secondary legislation has
yet been prepared to supplement the framework
act. However, it can be expected that the resi-
stance of bureaucracy itself will be a serious ob-
stacle in the realisation of this reform. The pre-
sent state of affairs (i.e. the system of informal
personal relations, the exploitation of bureau-
cratic control over many spheres of public life)
enables officials to reap diverse benefits. This
fact allows us to presume that the bureaucratic
reform will be one of the most complicated and
long-lasting reforms and that it will require sub-
stantial political will from the reformers.
2. The most important 
socio-economic reforms
2.1. Budgetary-fiscal reform
The tax reform has initiated the process of mo-
dernising RussiaÕs economy. High Petroleum pri-
ces, which have a significant influence on the
amount of budgetary income, were conducive to
the realisation of this reform. Changes to the fi-
scal system have been thorough, encompassing
practically every tax and fiscal payment. The
first changes were carried out already in 2001
with the decision to introduce, among other
things, a 13-percent linear personal income tax
for individuals (PIT) and a regressive social tax
(social security contributions, etc. Ð initial rate
of 35.6 percent). The most significant changes
over the following years included, among oth-
ers, the reduction of corporate income tax (CIT)
to 24 percent, the almost complete resignation
from turnover taxes and the replacement of na-
tural resources payments with one tax19.
The main assumption of these changes was to
simplify the tax system, depart from taxes and
fiscal payments, which had been particularly dif-
ficult to collect, lower tax burdens imposed on
the economy and, as a result, draw the largest
possible amount of money out of the Ògrey zo-
neÓ (shadow economy). Tax rates were reduced,
however, taxpayers were simultaneously depri-
ved of most tax reliefs, which, ultimately, did not
always lower factual tax burdens. On the one
hand this type of activity resulted from the ratio-
nalisation of reliefs offered by the state, on the
other Ð it was a way of securing the stateÕs bud-
getary stability.
The first stage, which Russia has already com-
pleted, was the creation of legal foundations for
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a new, more transparent tax system. In course of
time, this system will be subject to further chan-
ges leading to the factual decrease of tax bur-
dens in Russia. The further lowering of taxes, ho-
wever, depends on the budgetary reform, the ra-
tionalisation and limiting of expenditure from
the public coffer. These changes, however, are
closely linked with the reform of budgetary rela-
tions of different levels, which have been taking
place since 2001. The main principle of these
changes was the assignment of individual taxes
to a concrete budget: federal, regional or local,
alongside the simultaneous clear division of
competences and financial responsibilities.
The tax reform, in spite of many problems and the
manipulation of clauses during the legislation
p rocess, has re n d e red Ru s s i a Õ s fiscal system much
m o re simple and transparent. Russian authorities
state that the tax collection process has also beco-
me more effective. More o v e r, the improved bud-
g e t a ry situation has allowed for the liquidation of
o v e rdue wages in the budgetary sphere (for the ti-
me being this only includes federal budget debts)
and the actual increase in wages in this sector. 
Despite the changes in the fiscal system, it has
only been possible to lower the tax burdens to
the economy to a small degree. It is estimated
that in 1999Ð2000 the level of tax burdens in the
economy was around 32Ð34 percent in relation
to the GDP and, in 2003, there are plans to redu-
ce these burdens to 30.7 percent of the GDP. The
results of the realisation of the main goal of the
changes Ð drawing the citizensÕ income out of
the Ògrey zoneÓ Ð are also limited. According to
different calculations, around 60 percent of busi-
ness activities in Russia are conducted outside
the legal framework20.
2.2. Pension reform
The need for a pension reform was proven by va-
rious analyses presenting unfavourable demo-
graphic tendencies (an ageing society, negative
natural growth). They testified that the hitherto
pension system wonÕt be able to performl its ob-
ligations. Therefore, it was necessary to aban-
don the system in which pensions are financed
from the contributions of those presently wor-
king and move to a system where each employ-
ed person saves money for their own pension.
In 2002 a Òsecond pillarÓ was formed, in which
the accumulative part of pension contributions
are stored21. Vneshekonombank has been entru-
sted with accumulating these contributions,
while private pension funds will be allowed to
invest these monies only as of 2004. ItÕs already
evident that, due to the lack of necessary secon-
dary legislations, this process will be drawn out.
According to estimates, around 90 percent of
those insured will not select a pension fund and
their contributions will continue to be invested
by Vneshekonombank. In accordance with the
pension reform act, the accumulative part of
pension contributions will be invested mainly in
Russian securities. 
The pension reform was a necessary step for en-
suring pension security, however, its success will
largely depend on the situation of RussiaÕs finan-
cial market. Without effective banking and insu-
rance systems or an effective stock market, it
will not be possible to invest pension contribu-
tions in a manner ensuring a decent pension to
those currently working22.
2.3. Banking system reform
The weak banking system is one of the factors
slowing down the growth of the Russian econo-
my. That is why the reform of this system is of
key importance for economic modernisation.
The financial crisis of 1998 brought about an al-
most complete destruction of this system in the
RF. Its post-crisis reconstruction aimed at the re-
al engagement of the banking sector in rebuil-
ding the Russian economic structures by streng-
thening the role of banks as intermediaries be-
tween investors and those saving money. As an
effect of the changes carried out in the financial
sphere, it was possible to reconstruct the ban-
king system and make it stronger in many ways
as compared to the pre-crisis system, yet still too
weak to take on the weight of these transforma-
tions.
RussiaÕs banking sector is very small23 and it is
dominated (as regards the asset amount and the
number of branches) by state potentates: Sber-
bank24 and Vneshtorgbank. The state has majori-
ty interest in over twenty banks and minority in-
terest in several hundred other banks. Most pri-
vate banks work almost exclusively for the ne-
eds of their owners, i.e. large industrial-financial
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groups. Of the 1,300 banks existing within the
RF in 2002, fewer than 250 had a capital exce-
eding the minimum binding in the European
Union (Euro 5 million). At present, banks finance
only around 5 percent of investments in Russia.
They prefer offering loans to traditional export
branches; the term of repayment of 70 percent
of these loans does not exceed one year25.
The banking sectorÕs reform programme, jointly
prepared by the government and the central
bank, is being realised at a very slow pace. It has
been possible to remove the central bank from
the group of VneshtorgbankÕs26 shareholders; ho-
wever, the CBR still remains the owner of Sber-
bank or foreign Russian banks, such as Moscow
National Bank (in London). Commercial banks in
the Russian Federation are obligated, as of 1 Ja-
nuary 2004, to adopt international standards
concerning accounting and financial reporting.
However, it has not yet been possible to accept
the act guaranteeing bank deposits (at present
only SberbankÕs individual deposits are guarante-
ed by the state)27.
2.4. On the way to the World Trade 
O r g a n i s a t i o n
One of the most important aims of RussiaÕs mo-
dernisation process was the opening up to the
world and intensification of foreign trade, as
well as gaining equal status in international tra-
de and opportunities for influencing its rules. An
important stage in the realisation of this policy
is membership in the World Trade Organisation
(WTO), which would include Russia in the group
of over 140 countries deciding about the stages
of trade liberalisation.
Russia declared its will to join the General Agre-
ement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT Ð the
WTOÕs predecessor) in 1993; however, the nego-
tiation process and the adaptation of Russian
law to WTO standards only began in 2000. The
g o v e r n m e n t Õ s subsequent decisions to lower
and unify customs rates for certain groups of go-
ods, simplify trade agreement principles and, as
a consequence, adopt the Customs Code by the
parliament in spring 2003, have liberalised Rus-
sian trade exchange and facilitated access to the
Russian market.
Despite intensive adaptation process and the in-
troduction of many changes to its law, Russia
has not yet been able to meet all the demands
set by WTO member countries. Many controver-
sial issues remain concerning RussiaÕs member-
ship conditions (including the insurance sector
and subsidies for the agricultural sector). On the
other hand, RussiaÕs industrial lobby, which is
not willing for Russia to open up to the world, is
trying to extend the accession process and nego-
tiate beneficial conditions for itself and is unwil-
ling to accept compromises during negotiations.
Time is against Russia Ð outside the WTO, Russia
cannot influence the establishment of new inter-
national trade principles during the curre n t
WTO negotiation round in Doha28.
2.5. Land reform
The introduction of land ownershipwas one of
the most important stipulations raised by Putin
regarding the guarantee of ownership titles in
Russia. The Land Code adopted in September
2001 and the act on the transactions of agricul-
tural land of June 2002, have introduced the sa-
le of land. The ownership title to land (restricted
for foreigners) was to stimulate the develop-
ment of the real estate and mortgage-secured lo-
ans market. However, in order for this right to
be executed, it is necessary to adopt secondary
legislations mainly at the regional level. An ob-
stacle is the lack of regulations concerning the
cadastral register, as well as a shortage of mo-
ney for geodesic measurements and for the regi-
stration of individual plots of land (this concerns
agricultural land in particular).
The success of the land reform depends, to a lar-
ge extent, on regional authorities. However, the-
se authorities, according to their needs, either
try to create the appropriate conditions for land
transactions, or slow down the reformÕs realisa-
tion process. Some regions still lack the necessa-
ry secondary legislations, while other entities of
the Russian Federation are legalising land trans-
actions (land trade already took place in the past
in some of these areas, despite the lack of fede-
ral regulations) and developing their real estate
markets. Additional problems have appeared in
the process of setting land prices. The admini-
strative fixing of land prices led to a great diffe-
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rentiation in prices between the regions as well
as within one region.
The decision to allow for land sales (both indu-
strial and agricultural) is quite revolutionary for
the Russian situation. It enables the develop-
ment of many branches of the economy, e.g. the
banking sector. However, difficulties in bringing
this law into force limit these opportunities con-
siderably and cast doubts on the further deve-
lopment of the real estate market, for example.
In accordance with the data provided by the Mi-
nistry of Economic Development and Trade, in
2002, once the Land Code came into force, 45
thousand industrial land purchase transactions
were registered in Russia (i.e. almost twice as
much as for previous years). However, this result
is much lower than the government had been
expecting29.
2.6. The reduction of excessive 
bureaucratic regulations
Acts reducing the dominating role of the state in
regulating economic life were adopted in July
2001. These concerned, among other things,
a considerable restriction of the types of busi-
ness activities requiring licensing; the simplifi-
cation of the registration procedure for new
companies; and also the protection of entrepre-
neursÕ rights (the number of state inspections
carried out in companies have been reduced,
and the inspection procedures have been made
less disturbing). However, as it turned out, some
clauses in these acts were inconsistent with the
binding law, e.g. the police act (to which police-
men carrying out the inspections adhered). Fur-
thermore, clerical staff proved to be completely
unable to undertake their new roles of helpers,
both in the psychological sense (it requires a dia-
metrical reversal of the present clerk-citizen re-
lationship), as well as the technical sense (a con-
siderable increase in tasks along with the insuf-
ficient computerisation of offices). An attempt to
simplify company registration procedures has
not lead to the reduction of queues or waiting ti-
me. On the contrary, it has increased the difficul-
ties faced by entrepreneurs. This Òde-bureaucra-
tisationÓ attempt has also failed to solve Rus-
siaÕs corruption problems30.
2.7. Power engineering reform
The reform of the energy monopoly United Ener-
gy Systems of Russia (RAO UES) and the liberali-
sation of RussiaÕs energy sector are of fundamen-
tal importance for reforming RussiaÕs entire eco-
nomy. The battle between supporters of this re-
form and its influential opponents, continuing
for over two years, finally ended on 21 February
2003 when the Duma adopted a package of bills
on the restructurisation of RAO UES and the ope-
rating principles of the RFÕs energy market. As
a result of disputes on the shape of this reform,
the legal basis for the restructurisation of Rus-
siaÕs energy sector is a compromise. The effect of
this compromise between the reformÕs suppor-
ters and its opponents is the maintenance of the
stateÕs full control over the regulation of energy
prices.
A fundamental restructurisation shall encom-
pass RAO UES itself. The reform divides the mo-
nopoly into state-controlled spheres (energ y
transportation and power management), as well
as spheres which will operate on the free market
and will become privatised Ð energy production
(power plants) and energy sales.
The realisation of the actual reform will begin
with a several-year delay (its commencement
was initially planned for the turn of 2001/2002).
Deadlines for the different stages of energy mar-
ket liberalisation, which were precisely outlined
in the original text of the act, have been remo-
ved. This, in theory, should facilitate the intro-
duction of legal amendments before the subse-
quent stages of the reform take place, yet it ac-
tually extends the timeframe of the liberalisa-
tion process31.
2.8. Railway reform
Russia is very dependent on railway transport,
which carries out almost 85 percent of freight
transport32. The legal basis for the reform of the
Russian railways was accepted in December
2002. The changes that were agreed upon re-
strict the state monopoly in railway transport
only to a small degree and, as a result, do not
provide much opportunity for introducing com-
petition into the sector.
A joint stock company (RAO) Russian Railways
(RR) is to be founded during the first stage of the
changes (summer 2003), 100 percent of shares in
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this company will be state-owned. The company
will take over most of the Railway Mini-
stryÕs present estate (from railway rolling stock
plants to health clinics in the furthest corners of
Russia), with the exception of land that is of stra-
tegic importance to the state, e.g. the land on
which railway tracks are located. Together with
the formation of the RR, private carriers are to
be allowed onto the railway market on Ònon-di-
scriminatory termsÓ. However, these conditions
have not yet been precisely outlined and, accor-
ding to preliminary documents prepared by the
Railway Ministry, it is the RRÕs management who
will decide who is allowed to use the railway ne-
twork. In such circumstances it will be difficult
to speak of free competition between private
carriers and the state monopoly.
During the second phase of the reform (by 2006)
the RR is to assign daughter-companies to run
long-distance and suburban passenger trans-
port, as well as the transport of goods. The aim
of this decision is also to depart from Òcross fi-
nancingÓ, i.e. financing deficits in passenger
transport by higher tariffs on the transport of
goods.
An obvious effect of this reform is the increase in
transport tariffs whereas the condition of the ra-
ilway rolling stock, the timeliness or quality of
the transport remains practically unchanged33.
2.9. The municipal reform 
The need to carry out a municipal reform was
demonstrated by the disastrous condition of in-
frastructure, not even capable of providing inha-
bitants with basic services such as water supply,
electricity or heating. Subsequent winters, du-
ring which inhabitants froze in their apart-
ments, showed the extent of problems in this
sector. However, authorities delayed the reform
fearing afall in social support that would be bro-
ught about by the inevitable rise in payments.
The governmentÕs programme to change the si-
tuation in the municipal sector appeared in mid-
2001 and concerned mainly the change in finan-
cing municipal services. The basic assumption of
this programme was to stop subsidising compa-
nies providing such services and transfer all co-
sts to the citizens. At the same time, the state
decided to create auxiliary mechanisms addres-
sed directly to the poorest citizens. 
The acts constituting the reform basically omit-
ted the issue of the performance of municipal
companies, their effectiveness and investment
policy. The government hoped that, through the
introduction of market prices for municipal se-
rvices, competition would appear on the market
and solve the problems with the companiesÕ
debts to gas and electricity suppliers, and the
lack of finances for investments.
Municipal infrastructure, the condition of which
is worsening from year to year, has, to some
extent, forced political approval for this unpopu-
lar reform in the pre-election year (parliament
adopted the municipal reform act in April 2003).
The ruling party have safeguarded themselves,
h o w e v e r, by introducing a transition period
(which will end after the elections), during
which the rise in payments for selected social
groups is to be limited. Additionally, regional au-
thorities will take on a large part of the respon-
sibility for the course of this reform.
The reform of this sector has basically only resul-
ted in the rise of prices, which did not match the
improvement in the quality of services provided.
Despite expectations, increases in rent and other
payments did not bring about the co-ordinated
opposition of regional elites, only sporadic pro-
tests of the population. Still, the introduction of
market principles into the municipal sector pro-
vides an opportunity for attracting investors to
the sector, because the sector requires the mo-
dernisation of its entire infrastructure in order
to be able to operate effectively34.
3. Reform of the Òpower structuresÓ35
Evidence of the great significance of Òpower
structuresÓ for RussiaÕs current authorities is,
first of all, the amount of money dedicated for
this purpose. National protection and internal
security expenses will cover 25 percent of the fe-
deral budget in 2003 (i.e. 4.5 percent of the GDP).
In recent years, the amount of money assigned
to the Òpower structuresÓ continues to increase.
In 2003, 2.6 percent of the GDP will be dedicated
to national protection while for most NATO
member countries this indicator does not exceed
2 percent (the USA is an exception with expendi-
ture equal to over 3 percent of the GDP).
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3.1. Military reform
Presently the reform of the armed forces is basi-
cally limited to the professionalisation of the ar-
my. A crucial argument for the need to professio-
nalise the armed forces was most probably the
collapse of the recruitment system inherited
after the Soviet army and preserved almost wi-
thout changes. A fall in the number of potential
recruits has added to problems linked with the
declining morale of soldiers (crime and desertion
common in the Russian army) and the evasion of
m i l i t a ry service at the beginning of the pre s e n t
decade. Russia has entered a demographic low
for this age group, which is expected to hit
a Ò rock bottomÓ low in 2010Ð2011. It wasnÕ t u n t i l
autumn 2001 that RF authorities made the deci-
sion to take professionalisation into account in
their plans to reform the armed forc e s .
The first stage of changes was the experiment in
changing the system of completing army units,
initiated in September 2002 at the 76th Pskov
Pa r a t roop Division. The divisionÕ s t r a n s i t i o n
from a conscription approach to contracting re-
cruits was to form a basis for the future profes-
sionalisation of the entire army.
The next stage of the reform began on 21 No-
vember 2002, when the Russian government ac-
cepted the concept for professionalising the ar-
med forces presented by the Defence Ministry.
According to Defence Minister Sergei Ivanov,
units of the land forces, paratroops and marine
infantry should change to the contract system
within four years (2004Ð2007). The professiona-
lisation of the army would be accompanied by
a reduction in the basic military service so that,
with the full completion of the armed forces
with contracted soldiers, military service would
be no longer than six months and would be re-
stricted to basic reserve training.
An important stage of the military reform will
be the final assent of the federal programme for
2004Ð2007 concerning Òthe filling of military
posts of the non-commissioned officer and sol-
dier ranks in the units of the Defence Ministry
and other power structures, primarily, by milita-
ry men completing military service in the con-
tract systemÓ. The president of the RF approved
this document in July 2003.
3.2. Changes in the security services 
s e c t o r
In early 2003, President Putin admitted that the
hitherto performance of the Òpower blockÓ 
couldnÕt be considered effective enough or inter-
nally coherent. On 11 March 2003, Putin issued
decrees on the strength of which the Federal Se-
curity Service (FSS) was strengthened. These de-
crees were approved by the Duma in June this
year. At the beginning of July 2003, the process
of consolidating the Òpower structuresÓ was ini-
tiated. According to declarations, this will gu-
arantee internal security in the country, help in
the fight against crime, terrorism and drug traf-
ficking. It should be noted, however, that the
changes being introduced are in fact a return to
solutions proven to be effective in the past. In its
structure, the FSS will be a reminder of its prede-
cessor, the KGB.
The main effect of changes in the Òpower struc-
turesÓ is the increase in the FSSÕs importance
and influence. However, it is too early to judge
whether or not this will increase the effective-
ness of the system. It is not yet known how the
FSS will use its authority.
4. Non-legislative changes
4.1. Changes in the Duma 
and on the political scene
The most important non-legislative change on
RussiaÕs political scene was the gaining by the
Kremlin of a loyal majority in parliament, which
increased its control over the legislative process.
Owing to the skilful use of the KremlinÕs political
and administrative potential (including state
media) in the parliamentary elections of 1999,
the pro-presidential party Unity achieved consi-
derable success. Two years after the elections,
influential Kremlin officials succeeded in actual-
ly incorporating UnityÕs most dangerous rival,
Fatherland-All Russia into the party and turning
the two into a party loyal to the Kremlin Ð Uni-
ted Russia. The Kremlin was also successful in
gaining the co-operation of other parties Ð Pe-
opleÕs Deputy, Russian Regions, which, together
with United Russia, form a stable, pro-Kremlin
majority in the lower chamber of parliament36.
Furthermore, in exceptional circumstances, the
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p resident and key officials from the Pre s i-
dentÕs Administration are able to mobilise a con-
stitutional majority (i.e. a majority authorised to
carry out amendments to the Russian Constitu-
tion) by way of bargaining with other parties Ð
e.g. RussiaÕs Liberal Democratic Party or the Al-
liance of Right-Wing Forces. 
In order to obtain political benefits, the executi-
ve branch often used informal instruments of
pressure on the parties. Among such instru-
ments worth mentioning are the granting of po-
sitions and privileges to deputies, regulating ac-
cess to popular state-owned media, control over
public prosecutors, courts or security services
holding information about the activities and fi-
nancing of parties or the private lives of party
members. The authorities also applied the Òdivi-
de et imperaÓ principle, supporting schismatic
tendencies in opposition parties Ð e.g. in the
Communist Party of the Russian Federation37.
Therefore, at present, we are facing a considera-
ble increase in the KremlinÕs control over the
parliament. This enables the Kremlin, in many
cases, to pass acts aimed at reforming numerous
spheres of politics and the economy. It should be
noted, however, that by declaring loyalty to the
president, some factions and individual deputies
in the Duma are simultaneously representing
the interests of big business, regional leaders or
other groups of influence. Such a conflict of inte-
rests sometimes reflects on the law (also with re-
gard to reforms) and is harmful for the state38.
Moreover, the KremlinÕs party and parliamenta-
ry base (often constructed bycentralised admini-
strative methods) is not a homogenous orga-
nism; it is ephemeral and often blatantly incom-
petent. The authorities are trying to improve the
rather poor public performance of pro-Kremlin
parties by way of mass propaganda in state-
owned media.
4.2. The increased role of the security
s e rvices in politics
Together with Vladimir Pu t i nÕ s rise to power, the
s h a re of the state security apparatusÕs e m p l o y e e s
in the ruling elites also rose considerably. When
building his team Putin, a former security servi-
ce official, was basing, among others, on people
with whom he had collaborated as an Intelligen-
ce Service officer, Federal Security Service head or
the RFÕs Security Council secre t a ry. The first years
of his government became a period of a s p e c t a-
cular expansion for the re p resentatives of securi-
ty services, who flooded civil stru c t u res in the
government, the Pre s i d e n t Õ s Administration and
other centres of politico-economic life, e.g. the
m e d i a3 9. Ac c o rding to the estimates of analysts,
one in every four re p resentatives of the most pro-
minent Russian elites has a m i l i t a ry education4 0.
ÒMilitarisedÓ elites include many re p re s e n t a t i v e s
of the security services Ð intelligence and counte-
rintelligence forces of the former KGB.
This influential group has certain characteristic
features that often affect the policy they run.
The ÒchekistÓ elite, according to analysts, has lit-
tle democratic or modernising potential, and the
activities undertaken or inspired by them have
often led to the restriction of pluralism in many
spheres of public life.
The potential of the ÒchekistÓ elite consists,
among other aspects, in direct access to the pre-
sident, a disciplined base, the ability to control
other elites (by control over information concer-
ning different spheres of public life, including
compromising information). At the same time,
the weaknesses of this group include, among
other features, a lack of homogeneity, the lack of
qualified specialists in many areas (e.g. in the
economy) and staff deficiency plus, often, a lack
of political intuition. 
There are, de facto, two blocks of ÒchekistsÓ Ð 
the Moscow ÒchekistsÓ (having a financial base
at their disposal as well as close relations with
regional elites) and the St. Petersburg ÒchekistsÓ,
who have gained influence on politics with Pu-
tinÕs rise to power. The St. Petersburg ÒchekistsÓ
(although they play a much greater role in poli-
tics) do not have extensive financial resources,
as they did not participate in the privatisation of
the 1990s. From the beginning of PutinÕs presi-
dency, this group has been attempting to accu-
mulate its own financial base. On the one hand
they took control over some of the state assets
(Gazprom, Rosneft). On the other, they keep try-
ing to force financial magnates to share their
fortunes by appealing for the revision of privati-
sation results.
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ChekistsÕ assets comprise primarily state-owned
companies Ð the battle for private assets has not
yet yielded spectacular effects41. Therefore, the
capital accumulated by this group is unstable as
it depends on the maintenance of their positions
within the state administration. 
An effect of the ÒchekistÓ expansion is also their
access to decision making not only in politics,
but also in the economic or social spheres42. As
a result of this group gaining strength in Russia,
certain activities are coming back into use: the
procedure of investigating denunciations by law
enforcement agencies43 and restrictions to the
freedom of speech. 
4.3. A change in relations between 
authorities and private business
During Boris YeltsinÕs presidency, close ties deve-
loped between big business and authority in
Russia, which ensured the direct influence of bu-
siness on state politics. Vladimir Putin has initia-
ted a series of processes in this sphere, which
have changed the nature of relations between
the state and big business:
Ð the direct influence exerted by industrial and
financial magnates on state politics has been vi-
sibly reduced;
Ð representatives of big business have been for-
ced to demonstrate their loyalty to the Kremlin
Ð meanwhile, disloyal individuals (Vladimir Gu-
sinsky, Boris Berezovsky) were subjected to eco-
nomic and political repression. Ostentatious ac-
tions against ÒdisloyalÓ businessmen or those
presenting political ambitions have, to a large
extent, resulted in the reduction of the oligarchsÕ
political aspirations; 
Ð the dependence of central authorities on the
support of big business has decreased. This is
a result of the stateÕs positive financial situation,
among other reasons, attained through the high
prices of raw materials on global markets and
the consequential stabilisation of the Russian
budget. In spite of this, business is still used to
finance various needs of the state or authorities
(the reconstruction of public buildings, charity
activities and financing pro- K remlin political
parties);
Ð alongside the existing, covert, corrupt lobby-
ing of big business interests in the state admini-
stration, institutionalised and open forms of
communication between business and authori-
ties have appeared44.
As a consequence of the changes cited above,
big business has lost its direct influence on the
KremlinÕs political decisions, yet it has mainta-
ined rather extensive influence within the eco-
nomic sphere. Despite the Òequal distancing of
oligarchsÓ announced by President Putin, many
of them have preserved a great potential of con-
nections and informal links with state structu-
res. The phenomenon of exploiting private (or
semi-private) capital by authorities in their poli-
tical interests still exists45. Big business, through
the use of civilised lobbying, as well as informal
ties (which is much more common) is able to
successfully strive for beneficial legislative solu-
tions46. Therefore, despite being politically we-
akened, business still constitutes one of the
most powerful groups of influence that the au-
thorities must reckon with.
4.4. An increase in the authoritiesÕ 
control over companies with state-owned
s h a r e s
With Vladimir PutinÕs rise to power, the new pre-
sidential administration began the process of re-
gaining state control over companies with state-
owned shares. A crucial success of the Kremlin
was the dismissal of GazpromÕs long-time presi-
dent Rem Vyakhirev and his replacement by the
PresidentÕs man Aleksei Miller. The initial period
of his rule became a staff revolution in the com-
panyÕs top authorities and the battle to increase
the monopolyÕs transparency. There are presen-
tly no members of VyakhirevÕs team left in Gaz-
promÕs management. At the same time, the new
team is trying to regain control over companies
that are dependent or in close collaboration
with the concern (SIBUR). However, the declared
reform of the monopoly has not begun. This re-
form provides for the division of Gazprom into
mining, transport and commercial structures
and allowing other gas producers to gain access
to the gas pipeline network. The liberalisation of
the companyÕs share market is only at the prepa-
ratory stage (currently in Russia only Russian ci-
tizens or companies are permitted to trade Gaz-
promÕs shares; the price of shares in Russia is
half of those sold on LondonÕs stock market). The
first stage of this process was the consolidation
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of the shares held by the state, owing to which
the RFÕs government and GazpromÕs daughter-
companies hold over 51 percent of the gas
giantÕs shares47.
Another important stage in restoring the control
of the new authorities over state-owned proper-
ty was the dismissal in January 2002 of Railway
Minister Nikolay Aksionenko, strongly linke d
with YeltsinÕs team. During AksionenkoÕs term of
office, the Russian railway system became
a Òstate within a stateÓ, working for the needs of
its managers. The ministry had formed a paral-
lel structure, which provided services for the mi-
nistry. This was a network of commercial (priva-
te) companies headed by the Corporative Finan-
cial Technologies company. Its head was the mi-
nisterÕs son Ruslan Aksionenko48. The minister
was forced to resign due to abuse charges49. He
was replaced by Gennady Fadeyev, who had wor-
ked for the Russian railways for many years and
was not linked with Putin. The KremlinÕs influen-
ce on the ministry was supposed to be secured
by deputy ministers loyal to Putin. 
The strengthening of the KremlinÕs control is al-
so evident in other companies with state-owned
s h a res: the energy monopoly RAO UES and
Transneft (the exclusive owner of oil pipelines
and petroleum terminals within the RF). With
PutinÕs rise to power, the Kremlin decided to let
the chairmen of both companies keep their posi-
tions, as the presence of managers of RAO,
Anatoli Chubais50, and Transneft, Semyon Vayn-
shtok51, guaranteed the realisation of the Krem-
linÕs policy. Chubais has prepared the reform of
the energy monopoly and forced it through the
parliament, whereas Vaynshtok did not obstruct
the use of Transneft as an instrument of state
control over the petroleum sector or as a tool in
MoscowÕs foreign policy52.
The regaining of control over state-owned com-
panies by the PresidentÕs Administration, on the
one hand, enabled the ÒchekistsÓ to accumulate
their own financial base and, on the other Ð
strengthened the KremlinÕs position in contacts
with big business. 
4.5. Changes to freedom of speech 
and freedom of the press
Actions undertaken by Russian authorities over
the past three years have led to an obvious re-
striction of the freedom of speech and informa-
tion pluralism.
The authorities have inspired the liquidation of
a number of opposition media (TV-6, TVS, Obsh-
chaya Gazeta) or the replacement of manage-
ment with persons loyal to the Kremlin (NTV,
other media belonging to the opposition holding
Media-Most)53. State-owned media are both favo-
ured and supported by authorities (e.g. through
the restructurisation of their debts, a beneficial
form of selling advertisements or granting exc-
lusive access to information). The authoritiesÕ
stance (lack of tolerance for criticism) does not
favour the media offering information that dif-
fers from the official viewpoint. All this renders
such undertakings economically unprofitable. It
has also created a self-censorship phenomenon
in the existing media: journalists and editors, fe-
aring sanctions, are imposing restrictions on
themselves when describing Russian authorities
or events taking place in Russia. This is accom-
panied by the societyÕs listlessness towards the
actual existence of censorship in the media54.
T h roughout Vladimir Pu t i nÕ s p re s i d e n c y, several
legal acts have also appeared, influencing the si-
tuation in the sphere of the freedom of speech (al-
though they were of less importance than infor-
mal activities). In June 2000, the Security Council,
dominated by re p resentatives of the Òpower sec-
torÓ, adopted the ÒDoctrine of information securi-
t yÓ, postulating, among other issues, the battle
against Òthe abuse of freedom of speechÓ. In Au-
gust 2000, the government issued a disposition
regarding the installation of certain devices on
telecommunication interfaces for monitoring
the flow of information by the security services
(this enabled, for example, a precise monitoring
of websites). However, the security serv i c e s
themselves remained uncontrolled. The authori-
ties attempted to amend the media law and re-
strict the work of journalists in special [extraor-
d i n a ry] circumstances. This amendment was
eventually vetoed by President Putin. However,
journalists themselves later voted on the co-
nvention obliging them to self-restriction in re-
lating special events. Finally, in March 2003, the
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Duma voted in the first reading, on the amend-
ment to the media law, imposing additional re-
strictions on the media during the election cam-
paign.
At present, viewpoints differing from the official
ones can be found only in several low circulation
papers or on the Internet. A large part of society
obtains information on events in Russia and the
world through state-controlled media. This way,
the authoritiesÕ attempts of monopolising the
transfer of information have been quite success-
ful. This is particularly significant during the
election campaign, which is already rolling, as
the media are used to lead the political battle.
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The methodology of the reform 
process in Ru s s i a
The practice of holding broad consultations at
the legislative phase is typical for the reform
process in Russia. Various lobbies (big business,
the ÒpowerÓ sector, regional elites) have access
to this process and aim at securing their intere-
sts in different spheres. As a result, these consul-
tations often distort the original liberal direction
of the reforms.
Consultations over the drafts of the reforms
with groups of influence begin already at the
conceptual stage (this often alters the shape of
these acts). The consultations are continued at
the stage of adopting the acts in the parliament.
This takes on the form of a Òzero readingÓ Ð the
draft bill is worked on in parliamentary commit-
tees with the participation of deputies from dif-
ferent factions, officials of the PresidentÕs Admi-
nistration and other influential groups involved
in the reform. In the case of controversial pro-
jects, the process of reaching an agreement can
drag on even for years. The agreed upon project
enters parliament and usually passes all re-
adings with no major problems. A good example
of this is the power engineering reform.
The aim of many reform projects is to purge dif-
ferent spheres of politics and the economy, and
to break up any shady deals. This triggers resi-
stance also during the realisation phase, after
the act is adopted in parliament and signed by
the president. Many clauses of the adopted acts
remain on paper, as Moscow lacks in the instru-
ments and possibilities to bring them into force
Ð either the resistance or incompetence of bure-
aucrats give rise to problems connected with the
secondary legislation to the acts, federal acts are
torpedoed on the regional level, and various fi-
nancial problems also appear.
The effects of the implemented changes
President PutinÕs high level of social support fol-
lowing his election in 2000 has enabled the reali-
sation of quite profound transformations within
the political sphere. The implemented changes Ð
legislative and informal Ð have resulted in the
centralisation of the state and the strengthening
of the KremlinÕs control over all spheres of Rus-
sian political life. They have also increased poli-
tical stability and pushed away the threat of the
disintegration of the Russian Federation, which
was very real under Boris YeltsinÕs government.
As a result of informal activities, the Kremlin has
gained considerable control over the parliament
and, in consequence, over the law-making pro-
cess in Russia. It maintains a strong influence
over the judicial branch and has led to the con-
siderable increase in control over the media.
Owing to this, the presidential circle has a gu-
aranteed smoke screen of propaganda for its ac-
tions. Authorities have also been successful in
stopping big business re p resentatives (Òoli-
garchsÓ) and regional elites from direct partici-
pation in the making of strategic decisions.
Thus, as compared to Boris YeltsinÕs presidency,
the power has been significantly concentrated
in the hands of the Kremlin. In many cases this
has been accompanied by a whole system of so-
lutions contradictory to the principles of a de-
moctatic state. All this has contributed to Rus-
siaÕs political system resembling that of an au-
thoritarian model.
The strengthening of the KremlinÕs authority
and the high level of income from gas and petro-
leum exports, securing RussiaÕs financial stabili-
ty, have enabled the intensification of economic
reforms. These reforms have, to a large extent,
constituted the continuation of transformations
initiated in Russia in the early 1990s and based
C E S  S t u d i e s
on those achievements (such as an advanced pri-
vatisation process and strong private sector; the
basis for a market economy system). Fiscal-bud-
get, banking, pension and other reforms carried
out under PutinÕs presidency have resulted in
the improvement of RussiaÕs image on the inter-
national arena. Despite the numerous economic
problems still remaining to be solved, Russia has
begun to be viewed as a politically and economi-
cally stable country (at least in the medium-
term). Over the past year, the Russian economy
has been granted the status of a market econo-
my by the USA and the EU. Russia has been cros-
sed off the FATFÕs blacklist (an international or-
ganisation battling against Òdirty money laun-
deringÓ), and has even been accepted as a mem-
ber of this organisation and, most importantly Ð
Russia has become a rightful member of the G8
group55. The changes being implemented have
also resulted in improved conditions for the run-
ning of business in Russia and the increased con-
fidence of investors in the Russian economy. Ho-
wever, at present this manifests itself mainly in
the reduction of capital outflow from Russia and
not in the growth of direct foreign investments.
At the same time, Russia is seen as a credible
debtor increasingly more often, which is evident
in the RFÕs increased rating56 on the internatio-
nal arena.
Many economic problems continue to re m a i n
unsolved. Attempts at activating small and me-
dium business, the battle against corruption and
e xcessive bureaucracy have failed. Above all the
slow pace of the structural reforms and the in-
consistency in introducing economic transforma-
tions have made it impossible to reduce the eco-
n o m yÕ s dependency on the export of raw mate-
rials. This slow pace also contributes to slowing
down the rate of economic growth and does not
allow for a radical change in Ru s s i a Õ s e c o n o m i c
model. As a consequence, Ru s s i a Õ s d e p e n d e n c y
on raw products was even higher in 2002 than in
p revious years5 7. Unsolved economic pro b l e m s
mean that it is difficult to consider Ru s s i a Õ s f re s h-
ly gained economic stability as permanent.
It is currently difficult to evaluate the real effects
of the reforms conducted under PutinÕs hitherto
presidency. Most of these can bring effects only
in a medium-term perspective, when investors,
entrepreneurs and citizens accept the new law
and recognise it as permanent, and the state ad-
mnistration elaborates effective mechanisms for
carrying out the adopted legal acts. 
Perspectives for the continuation 
of reforms within the scope 
of the present system
By the end of President PutinÕs first term of offi-
ce, the future of reforms in Russia does not yet
seem settled. Over the coming years we can
expect both an acceleration and a slowdown in
changes. The most probable scenario, however,
seems to be the maintenance of status quo Ð the
progressing, but slow and inconsistent imple-
mentation of reforms. 
A high level of support for Vladimir Putin in the
2004 elections may induce the acceleration of re-
forms. If Putin is re-elected already in the first
round, then his stronger social legitimacy may
favour a more dynamic and uncompromising im-
plementation of reform projects. The reform pro-
cess may pick up pace under the condition that
the strong president decides to dedicate his se-
cond term of office to the implementation of re-
forms, builds a homogenous reform-oriented te-
am and skilfully manoeuvres existing groups of
influence. 
The reforms may be brought to a stop if the pre-
sidentÕs position is weakened, e.g. if he gains
a poor election result. The modernisation pro-
cess may also slow down if the priority of the se-
cond term of office is the issue of succession
after Putin. This could become a cause of conflict
around the division of properties within the RF.
Representatives of the ÒpowerÓ sectors granted
authority by Putin (the ÒsiloviksÓ), despite large
political influence, have not yet been able to
acquire a significant financial base. In the face of
President Pu t i nÕ s imminent departure (in accor-
dance with the constitution, the 2004Ð2008 term
of office should be his last), the ÒsiloviksÓ may
intensify their efforts aimed at the takeover of
some estates of post-Yeltsinite financial magna-
tes. The series of investigations initiated against
the Yukos oil company in July 2003 can be consi-
dered a forecast of these actions. The continu-
ation of this type of pressure on big business in
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Russia with the use of courts, public prosecutors
and other state bodies will inevitably worsen
the RFÕs image among investors, simultaneously
undermining the effects of the liberal reforms
carried out over recent years. Another potential
factor slowing down the reform process can be
the destabilisation of the situation in Russia,
which could be caused, for example, by the esca-
lation of the conflict in Chechnya or the battle
between the groups of influence if it should eva-
de the KremlinÕs control. 
The intermediate scenario (maintenance of sta-
tus quo) assuming the slow and inconsistent im-
plementation of reforms can be realised if ten-
dencies observed during PutinÕs first term of of-
fice are preserved, i.e. in the case of the joint ap-
pearance of factors supporting and restricting
the reform process:
The reforms could be advocated by:
Ð the evident support of the president himself
for selected liberal economic reforms;
Ð the strong representation of liberally oriented
officials in the presidential team;
Ð the KremlinÕs considerable control over legisla-
ture. 
The reform process could be obstructed by:
Ð the necessity to take into account the interests
of powerful groups of influence surrounding the
Kremlin (particularly the ÒpowerÓ sector and big
business);
Ð the deepening authoritarianism of the political
system, which is leading to phenomena conflic-
ting with the spirit of liberalism, including the
partial politicalisation of the economy, the we-
akening of democratic social institutions (media,
NGOs, etc.) and, at the same time, the paralysis
of social control mechanisms;
Ð the often-present contradiction between the
formal law and its practical execution by autho-
rities. As a result, the recipients and potential
beneficiaries of the reforms (e.g. foreign inve-
stors) approach the changes that are being im-
plemented with distrust, aware of the fact that
the new regulations donÕt always have to be re-
spected by authorities or officials.
Aside from internal factors, external factors will
also be of great significance for the reform pro-
cess, particularly the pace of global economy de-
velopment, especially the situation on the raw
product markets, mainly the petroleum market.
If oil prices remain high, then Ð paradoxically Ð
the pace of changes may be slowed down. The
countryÕs favourable financial situation may ad-
vocate the postponement or mitigation of the
unpopular consequences of economic reforms.
On the other hand, should oil prices fall drama-
tically and permanently, the limited financial re-
sources may restrict the stateÕs reform possibili-
ties. The fall in oil prices to a level that does not
cause a crisis in Russia but forces a more rational
management of budget resources may prove to
be the most mobilising factor for carrying out
these changes. This would induce authorities to
search out alternative sources of income and se-
ek a policy aiming at making the Russian econo-
my less dependent on revenue generated by the
fuel and energy sector.
Jadwiga Rogoýa, Iwona Wiæniewska
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